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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Cases selected by WILLIAM STRUTHERS ELLIS.
ELECTIONS.
i. Registrationof Voters-State Statute.
Statutes 1892, Chap. 351, 22, of Massachusetts, provides that certain
persons, before registering for election purposes, "must read from the'
official edition of the Constitution at least three lines, other than the title,

in such manner as to show that he is neither prompted nor reciting from
memory," and that he shall also "write his name in the register." Held,
that such provision is not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States. The right to vote is not one of

the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship within the
meaning of the" Fourteenth Amendment: Stone v. Smith, Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, FIELD, C. J., June
Rep., 521.

22,

1893, 34 N: E..

INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
2.

Vagrants.!

Revised Statutes 8849, of Missouri, which authorizes the hiring of a
"vagrant" for six months to the highest bidder, contravenes both the
State Constitution and I of the Thirteenth Amendment of the Federal .,.
Constitution, which declare against "slavery" or involuntary servitude
except in punishment of crime whereof the party shall have 'been duly .
convicted: Thompson v. Bunton, Supreme Court of Missouri, SHERWOOD, J., June 19, 1893,22 S. W. Rep., 863.
MECHANICS'

LIENS.

3. Legislation Necessary.
Article 20, I5, of the Constitution of California provides that mechanics, material men,-etc., shall have a lien upon the property upon
which they'have bestovied labor or furnished material, etc., and that the
legislature shall provide by law for the speedy and efficient enforcement
of such liens. Held, that the provision is not self-executing, but
requires legislation to give a lien: Spinney v. Griffith, Supreme Court
of California, SEARLTES, C. J., April 18, 1893, 32 Pac. Rep., 974.
STREET RAILWAYS.

Title of Statute-Trolley System-Charter--Substitution of
Electric Motive PowerforHorse or Steam Power.
The Act of March 4, 1870 (P. L. 1870, p. 529), of New Jersey confer-ing upon a certain "Horse and Steam Railroad Company" authority to
construct and operate a railroad in certain streets of a city, which had
4.

"
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'CORPORATIONS.

for its object the conferring of privileges additional to those granted by
I.he'.original charter, is not unconstitutional because its object is not
expressed in its title, which title merely refers to the company by its
naine. "It was no more necessary to refer in the title to all the powers
to be given by the supplement than it was to set out in detail every fran'.hise granted to the corporation by its charter:" Paterson Railway Co. v.
-Grandy, Court of Chancery of New Jersey, G1utuN, V. C., April 28, 1893,

26 Atl. Rep., 788.
See MUNiCIPAL CORPORATIONS AND PuBrc LAW, 6.

CORPORATIONS..
Cases selected by Lzwxs"LAWRmNCz

SM iH.

NATIONAL BAN$KS.

i. Accommodation Indorsers-UltraVires.
A national bank cannot loan its credit or become an accommodation
indorser: National Bank of Commerce v. Atkinson, Circuit Court, District of Kansas, RINnR, D. J., April I, 1893, 55 F~ed. Rep., 465.
2. Powers of President-Executionof Note.
The president of a national bank has no power inherent in his office
• to'bind the bank by the execution of a note in its name; but power to
do-so may be conferred on him by the board of directors, either expressly, by resolution, to that effect, by subsequent ratification, or by
acquiescence in transactions of a similar nature, of which the directors
have notice.. Ibid.
-PowrzRs.
3.

Capacity to hold Land-InquiryInto.

The capacity of a corporation to take a conveyance of land cannot,
after the transfer has reached completion, be casled in question in a collAteral way, except by the State, and not by a private suitor: Connecticut
Mut. Life Ins. (o. v. Smith, Supreme Court of Missouri, SHnRWOOD, J.,
May 24, 1893, 22 S. W. Rep., 623.
QUO WARRANTO.

4. Function of, as Against a Corporation.
The object of a proceeding in quo warranto against a corporation is
to determine by what right it exercises a certain franchise; a "franchise,'.' as here" understood, being, as defined by Kent, a particular
privilege conferred by the grant of the government, and vested in individuals, or, as defined by Blackstone, a branch of the king's prerogative
subsisting in the hands of a subject. Or it may be to oust it from the
right to be a corporation for an abuse or nonuser of franchises granted.
Hence it is that the State must always be the plaintiff, as it alone can
complain of such usurpation of its authority, or abuse of privileges
granted. It is not, then, a suit for the vindication of the proprietary
rights of the individual, as against the claims of a corporation; the
remedies of the individual against a corporation for the recovery of
property being the same as against a natural person : State ex rel Waddell v. R. R. Co., Supreme Court of Ohio, MINSHALL, J., April 25, 1893,
33 N. E. Rep., io5.

EUI'. r.
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STOCKHOLDERS.
5. Right to Inspect Books.

In Louisiana it was held that, while a stockholder has the right to
inspect the books of the company at all reasonable times, he cannot
recover damages against it because the secretary refuses him permission
to make sdch inspection: Legendre v. Brewing Association, Supreme
Court of Louisiana, April 24, 1893, BREAUX, J., 12 So. Rep., 827.
SUBSCRIPTIONS.

6. Fraud.
Where a subscription to stock of a corporation, and subsequent payment for the stock, are procured by fraudulent representations as to the
purposes of the corporation and the amount of paid-up stock, the stockholder may recover back land and money with which he paid for the
stock, notwithstanding the insolvency of the corporation; its creditors
not being parties to an action for such relief: Ramsey v. Mfg. Co.,
Supreme Court of Missouri, Division 2, BURGESS, J., May 30, 1893,
22 S. W. Rep., 719.

FQUITY.
Cases selected by

ROBERT P. BRADFORD.

CANCEzLATION OP BONDS.
Multiplicity of Suits.
i.

A bill in equity brought by a village corporation, against sixty
respondents, asking that they be perpetually enjoined from negotiating
or delivering to any person certain bonds and coupons issued by said
corporation and owned by the respondents, and praying that the same
be cancelled, may be sustained upon the inherent jurisdiction of equity
to interpose for the purpose of preventing a multiplicity of suits. It is
in the nature of a bill of peace, the rights of all the parties involved
depending upon the same question both of law and fact.
A court of equity will not order the cancellation of bonds unless it.
be shown that a necessity exists to prevent irreparable injury, which a
court of equity alone can avert: Farmington Village Corp. v. Sandy
River Nat. Bank, Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, FOSTER, J., August
6
13, 1893, 27 Atl. Rep., 9 S.
EQuITY JUISDICTION.
2. Religious Associations-Powers of

Supreme JudicatoryTitle to Property.
The constitution of a church of the associated class provided that
no amendment should be made thereto except on request of two-thirds
of the whole society, and that the confession of faith should not be
amended. The general conference of such church decided that such
provisions were "extraordinary and impracticable." Held, that the
decision of the supreme judicatory of a religious denomination of this
class is not conclusive upon the coiirts when it is in open and avowed
defiance and in express violation of the constitution of such body : Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall., 679, distinguished.
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EQUITY.

Complainants alleged that they were duly elacted trustees to hold
certain church property, and that defendants were illegally elected by a
seceding faction of the church, and were holding the property in perversion of the lawful trust. Held, that the remedy by injunction being
peculiarly adapted to the necessities of the case, a demurrer for want of
equitable jurisdiction must be overruled: Brundage v. Deardorf, U. S.
Circuit Court, Northern District of Ohio, TArT, J., May 12, 1893, 55 Fed.
Rep., 839.
R SCISSION OF CONTRACT.
3. FraudulentRepresentations.
In an action by the vendee to rescind a purchase of land on the
ground of fraudulent representations by the vendor, where the findings
show facts indicating that because of the fraud plaintiff has been injured
to the extent of many thousands of dollars, they support judgment for
plaintiff although no specific amount of damages is found.
In an action by the vendee to rescind the purchase of a vineyard
Where it appears that the plaintiff was prevented from making a critical
examination of the premises by misrepresentations of defendant's employe, there is no presumption that plaintiff relied on his own judgment
in making the purchase, instead of the representations of defendant:
Wainscott v. Occidental Bldg. and Loan Ass'n, Supreme Court of California, SzkRIs, C., May 12, 1893, 33 Pac. Rep., 88.
R

XS,TING TRusTs. "
4. Payment by One, Title in Name of Another-Statute.
Complainant and his mother purchased land through an agent, H.
For convenience it was agreed that the title should be taken in the name
of H, H to convey to the purchasers when they had agreed upon a
scheme of division of the property, H agreeing to reconvey when
requested: Held,'under How. St., 5569, that the persons furnishing the
money had no rights in the property as against H's creditors, and a sale
under execution against H would not be enjoined; Putnam v. Tinkler,
83 Mich., 628, distinguished: Barnes v. Munroe, Supreme Court of
Michigan, GRANT, J., June i, 1893,55 N. W. Rep., 431.
SPECIrIC PERFORMANCE.
S. PersonalServices-Mutuality.
A verbal contract whereby plaintiffagrees to live with an old woman
until her death, in consideration of her promise to leave all her property to plaintiff, is taken out of the Statute of Frauds by the rendition
of the services during the lifetime of the woman, and, after her death
(which -here occurred within four months of the execution of the contract), equity will specifically enforce the contract on the theory of part
performance, since the services were of a peculiar character, and not
intended by the parties to be measured by a pecuniary standard: Brinton
v. Van Cott, Supreme Court of Utah, MINER, J. (BLACKBURN, J., dissenting), April 15, 1893, 33 Pac. Rep., 218.

MVIUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW.
Cases selected by
CHINESt EXCIUSION.
x. (a) National Control

MAV1nx R. LONGSThZTr.

of Immigration and Emigration.

Every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty and.
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within
its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe; and the right of a nation to expel
or deport foreigners who have not been naturalized or taken any steps
toward becoming citizens of the country rests upon the same grounds,
and is as absolute as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrancee
within its dominions.
(b) Exfiulsion of Chinese.
Chinese laborers residing in the United States, are entitled, like all
other aliens, so long as they are permitted by the government to remain
in the country, to all the safeguards of the Constitution and to the pro-'
tection of the laws in regard to their rights of person and property and
to their civil and criminal responsibility; but as they have taken no step,
to become citizens and are-incapable of becoming such under the naturalization laws,'they remain subject to the power of Congress to order
their expulsion or deportation whenever, in its judgment, such i measure is necessary or expedient for the public interest.
(c) Geary Ac-Constilulionality.
The proceeding provided for in the Act of May 5, 1892, better known
as the Geary Act, is in no proper sense a trial and .sentence for crime,
nor is the order of deportation a banishment in the technical sense, but the whole proceeding is merely a method of enforcing the return to his,
own country of an alien who fails to comply with the conditions prescribdd for his continued residence here; and the provisions of the Constitution requiring due process of law, and trial by jury, and prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures, and cruel and unusual punishments,
have no application.
(d) Geary Ad-Evidence-Burden of Proof.
The provision which puts the burden of proof upon a Chineselaborer
arrested for having no certificate, as well as the requirement of proof by
one credible white witness that he was a resident of the United States at
the time of the passage of the act, is within the acknowledged power of
every legislature to prescribe the evidence which shall be received, and
the effect of that evidence in the courts of its own government: Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, Supreme Court of the United States, GRAY, J:
(FULLER, C. J., FIELD, 3. and BREWER, J., dissenting), May. 15, 1893, 13
Sup. Ct Rep., io16; x49 U. S., 698.
LocAL AssEssarzNTs.

2. Liability of Public Property.

-

While constitutional and statutory exemptions from taxation of property of the State, county and municipal corporations do not refer to or
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MUNICIPA4 CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW.

include special assessments for local improvements, still as 'the government is not bound by a statute, the words of which tend to restrain or
diminish any of its rights or interests, unless it be specifically mentioned
therein,- therefore statutes conferring power upon municipal corporations
'to levy special assessments are not to be interpreted to confer the power
qflevjing such assessments upon the property of the State, counties or
munidipal corporations unless the intent of the legislature to render it
liable clearly appears. It is not a question of exemption but of delegated
authority. And especially will such authority not be presumed to have
been delegated when the only remedy provided for enforcing the assessment is such that it could not be used against public property as a lien
enforceable by sale : Kinzqy v. Kinzey, Supreme Court of Missouri
BRACE, J., May 8, 1893, 22 S. W. Rep., 498.
MUNICIPAL SEcuRIims.

3. Estoppel by Recitals.
Municipal corporations are estopped, as against bonafide holders of
municipal bonds, from setting up as a defense to an action thereon that
all the preliminary steps necessary to authorize the issue of bonds were
not taken, when the officers who had charge of the issue of such bonds
are especially or impliedly authorized to determine whether all the conditions precedent to the issue of valid bonds have been complied with,
and recite in the bonds so issued that they have been complied with. It
is not necessary to estop the corporation that.this statement should set
forth in detail that all the preliminary steps have been taken. It is sufficient that it declare that the bonds are issued in pursuance of a certain
statute, specifying it. Neither is it essential that the officers issuing'the
bonds should be expressly authorized to determine such questions. It
is sufficient if they are given full control in the matter: Coler v. Dwight,
School Township, Supreme Court of North Dakota, Copi-ss, J., April
25.. 1893, 55 N. W. Rep., 587.
PUnuLIO OFOICERS.

4. (a) Impeachment-Inifieachable Offence.
Where, in an impeachment proceeding, the act of official delinquency
consists in the violation of some positive provision of the Constitution or
statute which is denounced as a crime dr misdemeanor, or where it is a
mere neglect of duty wilfully done, with a corrupt intention, or where
the negligence is so great and the disregard of duty so flagrant as to wmrrant the inference that it was wilful and corrupt, it is a misdemeanor in
office within the constitutional provision that "all civil officers
shall be liable to impeachment for any misdemeanor in office." But
where such act results from a mere error ofjudgment, or omission of duty
without the element of fraud, or where the alleged negligence is attributable to a misconception of duty, rather than a wilful disregard thereof,
it is not impeachable, although it may be highly prejudicial to the interests of the State.
(b) Impeach-ment-Degreeof Proof.
Impeachment is, with respect to production of evidence and quantum of proof required to warrant a .conviction, essentially a criminal

PLEADING AND PRACTICE.
prcsecution; hence the guilt of the accused must be established beyond
•a reasonable doubt: State v. Hastings, Supreme Court of Nebraska,
POST,J. (MAXWELL, C. J., dissenting), June 5, 1893, 55 N. W. Rep., 7745. Impeachment-After Term of Office.
The power of impeachment conferred by the constitution upon the
legislature extends only to civil officers of the State, and this power can
not be exercised after the person has gone out of office. Private citizens
are n6t amenable to impeachment: State v. Hill, Supreme Court of
Nebraska, NORVAL, J., June 5, 1893, 55 N. W. Rep., 794.
'STREET RAILWAYS.
6. ElectricMotive Power-Constructionof Charter-Substitution
of ElectricMotive Powerfor Horse or Steam Power.
Where the charter of a "horse and steam railway company," granted
in 1866, authorized the company "to use on its roads cars to be operated
'by such motive power as they may deem expedient and proper," such
authority is not limited to the methods known or in practical use at the
time of the grant, but embraces all improvements which science and ingenuity may devise, including the electric trolley system. But if a later
.act requires that no electric wire shall be constructed above the surface
-of city streets until the Board of Commissioners of Electric Subways shall
.authorize the sanie, this will operate as a new limitation upon the pre-,
-vious concession of authority, and a street railway company which has
placed an overhead wire along a street without the consent of said board
is not entitled to an injunction restraining people from cutting said wire:
-Paterson Railway Co. v. Grundy, Court of. Chancery of New Jersey,
GREEX,V. C., April 28, 1893, 26 AUt. Rep., 788.
.
7. Occupancyof Streets-Rights of Abutting Owners.
Purchasers of lots abutting on a plotted street acquire the easements"
-of access, light and air; and they are entitled to. have the street forever
4
kept open, though the fee may be in the town as irustee for the public,
instead of the abutting owners for street uses. Municipal corporations, "
-Vhen empowered by thelegislature to do so, may devote a reasonable p 6 rtion of the street to the use of a street railway, without making compen.:
.sation to abutting owners, since such is a proper use of the street. But
the easement of abutting owners on a street are property rights; and
whether the fee of the streets is in such owners, or in the city in trust for
street uses, the legislature cannot devote the entire width of the street.
to railroad purposes, unless compensation is first made to the owner for
the taking of his easements, though there may be no special constitutional restriction by the legislature: Dooly Block v. Salt Lake.Rapid
Transit Co., Supreme Court of Utah, BARTcH, J., June 5, 1893, 33 Pac.
Rep., 230.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE.
Cases selected by A4,RDZmus STEWART.
PLEADING.
EJECTMENT.
In ejectment, defendant may withdraw a plea of not guilty, and file-a demurrer to the complaint.
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PLEADING AND PRACTICE.

In ejectment, pleas of -not guilty and disclaimer are incompatible,
and cannot be pleaded together: Burebaum v. McCarley, Supreme Court
of Alabama, COLzMAN, J., April 26, 1893, 12 So. Rep., S.
PRACTICE.
OF ACTION.
I. Death of Plaintiff in Suit for Dower.
Plaintiff sued to recover dower, and obtained judgment. Defendants
asked for leave to pay, in lieu of dower, a gross sum, which plaintiff had
signified her willingness to accept. The Court thereupon ordered a
xefdrence to*ascertain such sum, and afterward rendered a decision in
writing rconfirming the report, and giving plaintiff a specified sum.
Before a formal order embodying such decision was prepared and signed,
plaintiff died. Held, that the action did not abate, but might be continned by pl~intiffs executor: Robinson v. Govers, Court of Appeals of
New York, O'BRIEN, J. (ANDREWS, C. J., dissenting), June 6, 1893, 34 N.
E. Rep., 209.
ABA rZimn

JUDGE.
2.

Disqualification.

A county judge is disqualified from trying a case by the fact that,
before his election to the office, he had been appointed receiver for one
of the parties: Franco-Texan Land Co. v. Howe, Court of Civil Appeals
of Texag, HEAD, J., May 3, 1893, 22 S. W. Rep., 766.
JUDGMENT.

3.

Entry 4fter Expiration ofJudge's Term of Offce.

A judgment does not become effective until.filed wiih the clerk, and
-is of no effect if filed after the expiration of the judge's term, no matter
when prepared and signed: Broder v. Conklin, Supreme Court of California, HARRISON. J., May 27, 1893, 33 Pac. Rep., 211.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.

4. Disqualification.
A land agent who is in partnership with an attorney under an agreement to pool their earnings, and divide them equally, is disqualified from
acting as justice of the peace in an action wherein his partner is attorney
for one of the farties.
A justice of the peace is disqualified from rendering judgment in
garnishment proceedings by the fact that, before his appointment to the
office, he had become a surety for plaintiff on the garnishment bond'Franco-Texan Land Co. v. Howe, supra.
MANDAMUIS.
5. Street Railways-Duties to Public.
The performance of the duties which a street railway company owes.
to the public to operate its lines in accordance with the provisions of a
city ordinance under which its road was constructed, may be enforced by
mandamus: City of Potwin Place v. Topeka Ry. Co., Supreme Court of'
Kansas, ALLEN, J., June io, 1893, 33 Pac. Rep., 309.

PROPERTY.
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RES JUDICATA.
6. Title to Land-Lien.
A decree in an action against plaintiff setting aside a deed of land by
defendant's grantor to him, and quieting her title thereto, is a bar to subsequent action by him to have declared and enforced a lien on such land
for taxes paid out by him, and for improvements made theron: Morarity
v. Calloway, Supreme Court of Indiana, CoPPEY, C. J., May 17, 1893, 34
N. E. Rep., 226.
VERDICT.
7. Average Verdict-Proof-Affidavits offurors.
Where a jury agree that each member thereof shall write out the
sum which he thinks plaintiff is entitled to recover, and then divide the
aggregate of such sums by twelve, and that.the quotient shall be the
amount of their verdict, such verdict is obtained "by a resort to the
determination of chance," within the meaning of Code Civil Proc. 657,
providing that for the purpose of obtaining a new trial such misconduct
of the jury may be shown by the affidavits of the jurors: Dixon v. Plums,
Supreme Court of California, GAROUTTE, J., May 3I, 1893, 33 Pac. Rep.,
268. See Flood v. McClure, 32 AMERICAN LAW RIGIST9R AND RXVIEW,
515.
8.

Motion to Amend

erdict- Where Made.

An application to amend a postea should be made to the trial judge,
and the court in banc shojild not entertain such a motion, unless the
matter is referred to the court by the judge: Peters v. Fogarty, Supreme
Court of NewJersey, DIXON, J., Jime 8, 1893, 26 Atl. Rep., 855.

PROPERTY.
Cases selected by WILIAx A. DAVIS.
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAAGES TO LAND.
i. Escafiing Oil-Nuisance-Distinction Between Damages
Causedby NaturalDevelopment and Otherwise.
The owner of land has the right to develop the same by digging for
coal, iron, gas, oil, or otlier minerals, and if in the progress of such
development, without fault or negligence on his part, an injury occurs
to the owner of adjoining land, no action for such injury can be maintained. Where, however, the injury is caused by the prosecution of a
business which has no necessary relation to the land itself, and is not
essential to its development, an action will lie.
The escape of oil of a pipe-line company, not clothed with the right
of eminent domain, and its percolation through plaintiff's land and
destruction of his springs, constitute a nuisance, and the company is
liable for consequential damages, regardless of negligence in permitting
the oil to escape: Hauck v. Tide Water Pipe-Line Company, Limited,
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, PAXSON, C. J., February 27, 1893, 26
Atl. Rep., 644; 32 W. N. C., 45 ; 153 Pa., 366.
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DEZD.
Covenant-Condition Subsequent--Forfeiturefor BreachPolice Power-Cemetery.
A provision in a deed, for land within a city to be used as a cemetery, that "the grantee, his successors and assigns, shall at all times.
maintain a good and sufficient fence around the premises," should be
construed as a covenant, and not as creating a condition subsequent,
'vhere it is evident that the grantor, who owned lands on both sides,
sought to impose a duty on the grantee to build all the fence inclosing
the cpnetery.
Where land has been used for a cemetery until it has become a
public nuisance, and the State, by legislative act, forbids further interment therein, the condition of the deed, if it were such, is destroyed,
and title vests absolutely in the grantee, though the act further provides.
that the city may have the bcqdies and monuments removed, and may
purchase the land for a public park.
Forbidding the use of such land as a cemetery is not a taking of the
grantor's property for public use within the Constitution, but is a valid
exercise of the police power vested in the State: Scovill v. McMahon,
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, HALL, J., November r, 1892,
26 A.tl Rep., 479.
2.

M RTGAGr.
3. "Foreclosureof Purchase Money Mortgage-SecificPerformance of Sale- Vendor's Lien- Waiver of-Dower.
Purchasers at a foreclosure sale who are not parties to the suit become
parties by signing the bid, and are liable to be proceeded against by
petition for the specific performance of their contract.
In New Jersey a purchaser at'a judicial sale is bound to take such
title as an examination of the proceedings-will show that he will get.
A. mortgage given by a husband to secure unpaid purchase money
due the vendor upon conveyance of the land mortgaged will have precedence over the inchoate dower of the wife, though executed and delivered
some time after the execution and delivery of the conveyance, unless the
vendor has in the meantime done some act which amounts to a waiver
of his equitable lien for the purchase money.
When a wife of the owner of land fails to join in the execution of a
mortgage, but afterwards joins her husband in a conveyance of the land
to a third person, and the mortgage is foreclosed against such third per-'
son without making the wife of the said mortgagor a party, the purchaser
under foreclosure will take the land free from the inchoate dower of the
wife of the mortgagor: Boortim v. Tucker, Court of Chancery of New
Jersey, PiTNzY, V.C., March 29, I893, 26 At. Rep., 456.
4. Priority- Vendor's Lien.
The mortgage of one who, without notice of a prior mortgage,
advances money to remove a vendor's lien from the mortgaged premises,
is superior to such prior mortgage to the amount that the money so

.TORTS.
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advanced was actually applied to the extinguishment of such lien: Price
v. Davis, Court of Appeals of Kentucky, PRYOR, J., April 29, 1893, 22 S.
W. Rep., 316.
RZCORDING.

5. Deeds and Morgages-Priority.
The Pennsylvania Act of March I8, 1775, provides that every deed
and conveyance which shall not be recorded within six months after the
execution shall be void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee
unless recorded before the recording of the deed under which such subsequent purchaser or mortgagee shall claim. Held, that a mortgage
actually recorded before a deed of the same premises is recorded has
priority over the deed, though the deed was recorded within six months
of its execution, and the mortgage was not; the six months' privilege of
delay being merely to protect the holders of unrecorded deeds against
subsequent conveyances of the same premises by the same grantors:
Fries v. Null, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, GREEN, J. (WUJ.IAmsand
MrIcHELr., JJ., dissenting), May I, 1893, 26 AU. Rep., 554; 32 W. N. C.,
236 ; 154 Pa., 573.

TORTS.
Cases selected by Ai.nXANDER

DUR3IN LAUUR.

DECEIT.

x. Representationsas to FutureEvents.
A complaint in an action for damages, alleging, that defendant, iv
order to induce plaintiff to lease from him certain premises, fraudulently
concealed the fact that a certain building thereon did not belong tohim,
but which fails to allege that defendant knew, or had reason to know,
that plaintiff was ignorant of the fact that defendant did not own such
building, and that the leasing of the premises by plaintiff was actually
induced by such concealment, is demurrable for failure to state a cause of
action.
A representation by defendant that plaintiff could have possession
of such building on a certain date, several months after the making of
such representation, is not actionable, though such event did not occr,
in that it relates to a future, and not to a past or present event: Sheldon
v. Davidson, Supreme Court of Wisconsin, ORTON, J., May 2, 1893, 55
N. W. Rep., i6I.
LIBEr.
Charginga Constable with Imfroper Solicitation in Obtaining
Fees.
There is no error in overruling a demurrer to a declaration which, in
effect, alleged the wilful and malicious publication of an article charging, in substance, that the plaintiff, who was a constable, solicited business for the magistrates' courts by attending the daily sessions of the
recorder's court, and inducing persons tried therein to sue out unneces2.
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sary warrants against other persons; the declaration further alleging
that by such publication it was intended to charge that the plaintiff did
the acts mentioned for the evil and corrupt motive of increasing his fees
as a constable. Whether or not there was probable cause for the belief
on the part of the defendant that the information received by it was
entirely reliable and trustworthy, and whether it acted in good faith in
the publication without malice, were questions of fact for the jury:
Augusta Evening Nears v. Radford, Supreme Court of Georgia, LUtmPKIN,
J., April 10, 1893, 17 S. E. Rep., 612.
So in Bourreseau v.Evening Journal Co.; 63 Mich., 425, it was held
not pyivileged to publish that a deputy sheriff, solely with a view to
increase his fees, hung around the highways and arrested men whose
*only offence was that they were poor and ragged.
MA,ICIOUS PROSnCUTION.

"

3. Prbable Cause.
0. charged J. before a justice of the peace with the commission of a
criminal offence. The jury found J. not guilty, and made a special finding in these words, "and that the complaint was made without probable
cause." J. then sued 0. for damages,-alleging that the prosecution wag
malicious and without probable cause, and set out in his petition the
special finding of the jury. Held, that it was error to overrule O.'s
motion to strike such special finding out of the petition: Obernalte v.
Johnson, Supreme Court of Nebraska, RAGAN, J., April 26, 1893, 55
N. W. Rep., 220.
SLANDER.
4. Adionable Words-Unchastily.
Words spoken of a woman, "that she was in the habit of entertaining gentlemen callers at all hours of the night," do not necessarily
impute unchastity: Hemmens v. Nelson, Court of Appeals of New York,
O'BRIrN, J., (Picm
Am and MAYNARD, JJ.), dissenting, June 13, 1893,
34 N. . Rep., 342. See Collins v. Dispatch Publishing Co., ante,p. gOi."

